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Executive Summary 
A Corporate Assess, Improve, and Modernize review was conducted at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to evaluate the LLNL Radiation Safety Program 
and recommend actions to address the conditions identified in the Internal Assessment 
conducted July 23-25, 2007.  This review confirms the findings of the Internal 
Assessment of the Institutional Radiation Safety Program (RSP) including the noted 
deficiencies and vulnerabilities to be valid.
The actions recommended are a result of interviews with about 35 individuals 
representing senior management through the technician level.  The deficiencies identified 
in the LLNL Internal Assessment of the Institutional Radiation Safety Program were 
discussed with Radiation Safety personnel team leads, customers of Radiation Safety 
Program, DOE Livermore site office, and senior ES&H management.
· There are significant issues with the RSP.  LLNL RSP is not an integrated,
cohesive, consistently implemented program with a single authority that has the 
clear roll and responsibility and authority to assure radiological operations at 
LLNL are conducted in a safe and compliant manner.
· There is no institutional commitment to address the deficiencies that are identified 
in the internal assessment.  Some of these deficiencies have been previously 
identified and corrective actions have not been taken or are ineffective in 
addressing the issues.
· Serious funding and staffing issues have prevented addressing previously 
identified issues in the Radiation Calibration Laboratory, Internal Dosimetry, 
Bioassay Laboratory, and the Whole Body Counter.  There is a lack of technical 
basis documentation for the Radiation Calibration Laboratory and an inadequate 
QA plan that does not specify standards of work.
· The Radiation Safety Program lack rigor and consistency across all supported 
programs.  The implementation of DOE Standard 1098-99 Radiological Control 
can be used as a tool to establish this consistency across LLNL.  The 
establishment of a site wide ALARA Committee and administrative control levels 
would focus attention on improved processes.
Currently LLNL issues dosimeters to a large number of employees and visitors that do 
not enter areas requiring dosimetry.  This includes 25,000 visitor TLDs per year.  
Dosimeters should be issued to only those personnel who enter areas where dosimetry is 
required
3Reviewer:
Leonard S. Sygitowicz, CHP
Purpose and Scope: To work with current Radiation Safety Section (RSS) Manager to 
identify and prioritize issues identified during multiple assessments conducted on the 
RSS processes. Also, to provide opinion as to the validity of issues and make 
recommendations regarding corrective actions.
Names/Organizations of Persons Contacted or Interviewed:
Dick Nugent/ Manager, Hazards Control Department
Kathy Shingleton/Section Leader, Radiation Safety Section
Tim Smith/Health Physicist, Field Operations
Bill Carl/Team Lead, Radiation Calibration Laboratory
Rick Thacker/Health Physicist, Field Operations
Todd Sudsmo/Health Physicist, Field Operations Team Lead
Jim Mecozzi/Team Leader, ES&H Team 1
Dave Prokosch/Team Leader, ES&H Team 3
Chuck Salsbury/ Health Physicist, DOE Livermore Site Office
Greg Jones/Health Physicist, ES&H Team 1
Warren TenBrook/Health Physicist, ES&H Team 3
Allen Macenski/Director, Environment, Safety, Health and Quality
Frank Russo/Principle Associate Director, Operations and Business
Reggie Gaylord/Associate Division Leader, Radiochemistry/Chemistry, Materials, Earth 
& Life Sciences
Doug Marden/Assurance Manager, Chemistry, Materials, Earth & Life Sciences
Bev DeOcampo/Team Leader, ES&H Team 1
Quang Le/Health Physicist, ES&H Team 1
Pedro Cabrera/ES&H Tech, Team 3
Peter Kirsten/ES&H Tech, Team 1
Miguel Castro/ES&H Tech, Team 2
Patrick Epperson/Deputy Division Leader, Radioactive and Hazardous Waste 
Management
Jerry Hopkins/Tech Supervisor, ES&H Team 4
DeWayne Rayford/Tech Supervisor, ES&H Team 1
Tracey Simpson/Team Leader, ES&H Team 2
Michele Sundsmo/Deputy Section Leader, Radiation Safety Section
Mike Merritt/Deputy Associate Director, Nuclear Operations
Jerry Paulson/Associate Director, Nuclear Operations
David Hickman/Team Lead, WCB/Spectroscopy Lab
Jack Topper/Team Lead, Personnel Dosimetry Lab
Steve McConnell/Division Leader, ES&H Teams Division
Mark Martinez/Deputy Principal Associate Director, Nuclear Materials Technology 
Program
Carolyn Wong/Team Lead, Radiation Measurements Lab/Bioassay Lab
Annmarie Wood-Zika/Team Lead, Internal Dosimetry
Documents reviewed:
· Internal Assessment of the LLNL Institutional Radiation Safety Program 
conducted July 23-25, 2007
· AIM Team Report, Nuclear Operation Directorate, LLNL
· Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Radiation Protections Program (RPP)  
UCRL-MI-222689
· NNSA for Cause Appraisal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
Radiation Protection Program, January 18-28, 2005
· DOE Standard Radiological Control DOE-STD-1098-988
· ESH Manual Volume 2
o Document 20.1 Occupational Radiation Protection
o Document 20.2 LLNL Radiological Safety Program for Radioactive 
Material
o Document 20.3 LLNL Radiological Safety Program for Radiation
Generating Devices
o Document 20.4 LLNL Occupational Radiation Protection ALARA 
Program
o Document 20.6 Exposure to Radiation in an Emergency
· Impact of Implementation of 13.2M Budget on HCD, December 4, 2007
· LLNL’s Radiation Protection Program (RPP) Internal Audit Results, 2002-2004
· Radiation Safety Program Peer Review, June2, 2004
· RSS’s Budget Augmentation Request for FY06
· LLNL’s Radiation Protection Program: Problems, Progress and Priorities, 
December 12, 2006
· Hazards Control Department Radiation Safety Section memo: Costa and Benefits 
of Various Dosimeter Issuance Policies of 29, Dec, 2007
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Name Organization Phone #
Jim Merrigan ESH&Q 4-6983
Allen Macenski ESH&Q 2-3343
Michelle Sundomo ESH&Q 4-2318
Kathy Shingleton HCD/RSS 2-5172
Dick Nugent HCD 3-7640
Review Results:
My review confirms that the findings of the Internal Assessment of the LLNL 
Institutional Radiation Safety Program (RSP) conducted July 23-25, 2007, including the 
noted deficiencies and vulnerabilities, to be valid.
5Actions Recommended:
Recommendation #1-
1. Reinforce Senior Management commitment to the Radiation Safety Program.
a. Establish clear roles and responsibilities for the site Radiological Control 
Manager (RCM).
b. Make appropriate organizational changes to implement one Radiological 
Safety Program with clear roles and responsibilities.
c. Establish communication and access to Senior Management on a routine 
basis for the Radiological Control Manager.
The lack of an integrated, cohesive, consistently implemented Radiation Protection 
Program with an assigned, visible, and recognized Radiological Control Manager has 
led to an inconsistently applied Radiation Safety Program across LLNL.  The 
organization of the Hazards Control Department separates the Radiation Safety 
section from those responsible for implementing the Radiation Safety Program.  Clear 
lines of authority are not understood by the customers of the Radiation Safety 
Program as reported in the Internal Assessment of the LLNL Institutional Radiation 
Safety Program July 23-25, 2007 and the AIM Team report on the Nuclear 
Operations Directorate of January 11, 2008.
Recommendation # 2-
2. Establish a project team to address the open deficiencies.
a. Establish a plan, set priorities, set schedules.
b. Complete all identified actions within one year.
c. Address Inter Assessment deficiencies as identified in the July 23-25, 
2007 (deficiencies 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 5.2, 6.1).
i. 1.1 – There are insufficient resources to both (1) manage risks 
associated with the conduct of current radiological operations and 
(2) accomplish needed improvements in the RSP.   Laboratory 
management has apparently decided to direct resources to support 
of current radiological operations rather than improve the program 
and address previously identified program deficiencies.  With only 
one exception, all observations/findings have been identified 
during previous assessments.  LLNL SEP (Safety and 
Environmental Protection Directorate) management has previously
been informed of the identified deficiencies, but has not taken the 
necessary action to resolve/eliminate the problems.
ii. 2.1 – There are no Technical Basis Documents (TBDs) for the 
RCL (Radiation Calibration Laboratory). For example, portable 
radiation detection instruments are on a calibration schedule that is 
beyond ANSI (American National Standards Institution) guidance 
(12 months) and accepted industry practice (6 months).  However, 
there is no TBD to support this decision.
6iii. 2.2 – The RCL QA (Quality Assurance) Plan is inadequate, e.g. the 
current plan does not specify standards for work.
iv. 2.3 – Assigned resources are not adequate for the workload at the 
RCL.  The RCL must continue to support the Laboratory’s needs 
for calibrating instruments, support a significant project for the 
purchase and installation of Canberra iCAMs (intelligent 
continuous air monitoring) in Building 332 (the Plutonium 
Facility, a DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility), 
update procedures and the QA Plan, develop TBDs, clean up 
Room 183 B&C cells in a timely fashion, and dispose of legacy 
sources.
v. 5.2 – There is no evidence of a standard laboratory-wide program 
for radiological recordkeeping.  Also, there is apparently no 
centralized document storage area for applied health physics 
records.  Retrieval of historical radiological records is difficult.
vi. 6.1 – The radiological surveys performed by the Materials 
Management Section for off-site transportation of radioactive 
material do no appear to be consistently documented as required by 
HP-FO-001 under provisions of the MOU.  The RSP needs to 
provide periodic training and sufficient oversight of the Materials 
Management Section to ensure HP-FO-001 is effectively 
implemented.  Since RSS (Radiation Safety Section) is the 
responsible organization for 10 CFR 835 compliance, this is a 
radiation safety vulnerability over which RSS has no control. 
d. Deficiencies 4.1, 5.1, and 7.1 can be addressed on a site-wide basis.
i. 4.1 - There is no formal, standardized document development and 
control system to ensure consistent technical and programmatic 
review of RSP procedures and Technical basis documents.  For 
example, HP-FO-004 appears to have been developed with 
significant input from ES&H Teams.  However, documentation of 
their input is lacking, as is documentation of review an input on 
other HP-FO (Health Physics – Field Operations) procedures.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that any training was conducted 
to ensure ES&H Teams could properly implement the field 
procedures.
ii. 5.1 – In two specific areas, ES&H Team health physicists are not 
allowed unfettered access to facilities and activities for which they 
have radiation protection responsibility. The affected areas were 
the Radioactive & Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) 
facility (ES&H Team 1) and for general health physics support 
provided by ES&H Team 4.  These health physicists are required 
to request access from the facility operators before they can enter 
the facility.  This practice puts the Laboratory in a position of 
significant liability should a radiation-related event occur.  This 
practice is of enough concern that it should be investigated to see if 
other LLNL safety programs are similarly affected.
7iii. 7.1 – (General) Protection and storage of combined external 
dosimetry, internal dosimetry, and whole body count hardcopy 
personnel dosimetry information is deficient.  Recent records 
(since 1985) are stored in a dedicated area with fire-suppression, 
but are not in fire-proof containers.  The data are not under secure 
access control during working hours, nor is there a designated 
individual with primary responsibility for managing these data.  
(The records room is locked during non-working hours).  The 
current staff is fully-burdened and cannot reasonably take on the 
additional task of records management.
LLNL has evaluated the assessment results and determined that the 
deficiencies cited above constitute evidence of programmatic 
weaknesses satisfying the criteria in the “DOE Enforcement 
Process Overview” for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance 
Tracking System (NTS).  LLNL has further determined that 
despite the assessment team finding no 10 CFR 835 
noncompliance issues, the deficiencies identified in this assessment 
constitute Quality Assurance (i.e., 10 CFR 830, Subpart A) 
noncompliance similar to noncompliances identified in previous 
assessments (and which were cited in the February 23, 2006, 
enforcement action received by LLNL) and which therefore further 
warrant the current assessment results being reported to the NTS.
The lack of an institutional commitment to address these deficiencies in a timely manner 
results in serious weaknesses in the Radiation Safety Program continuing to exist.  The 
majority of these deficiencies have been identifies and not addressed back to 2005.
Recommendation # 3-
3. Re-establish funding and staffing to keep commitments made as a result of the 
MOVER event and subsequent NNSA for Cause Review, including commitments 
made in the PAAA enforcement action.
a. Recent budget actions could result in the Radiation Calibration 
Laboratory, Internal Dosimetry, Bioassay Laboratory, and the Whole 
Body Counter being unable to provide services in accordance with 
commitments previously made.
b. Establish a minimum level of service with Programs to assure radiological 
control resources.  
The recent budget reduction in the Radiation Calibration Laboratory, Internal Dosimetry, 
Bioassay Laboratory, and the whole body counter reduces resources below a level to 
remain compliant.  The corrective actions taken as a result of the MOVER Event and 
subsequent NNSA for Cause Review establish a commitment to maintain support for 
instrument replacement and technical basis improvement.  The recent budget reduction 
results in support below the committed level.  
8Recommendation # 4
4. Implement Standard 1098-99 standard establishing a site-wide Radiological 
Control Manual.
a. Use a tool to establish consistency and rigor to the Radiological Control 
Program.
b. Implement site-wide ALARA Committee.
c. Set site-specific administrative control levels.
The implementation of Standard 1098-99 establishing a site-wide Radiological Control 
Manual is a contract expectation.  The implementation of this standard would establish a 
consistent site-wide Radiation Safety Program with clear roles and responsibilities, 
authority, and accountability.  The Programmatic weaknesses that are identified in this 
report will be addressed if this standard is implemented in a timely manner.  LLNL is one 
the only organizations that hasn’t previously embraced this standard.  The field 
organizations interviewed indicated that the rigor and process that standard requires is 
needed to improve the existing program.
Recommendation # 5-
5. Limit issuing dosimeters to only those employees and visitors that enter 
radiological controlled areas.
The present policy of issuing dosimeters to all LLNL staff and all visitors that will be on 
site for more than 2 weeks or who plan to enter facilities with radiologically controlled 
areas needs to be revised.  Only a small fraction of the personnel issued dosimeters 
actually enter areas where dosimetry is required.  More than 25,000 visitor dosimeters are 
issued annually, most of which are not used to enter radiation areas.  LLNL total 
dosimeters processed are about 47,000 annually.  As reported in a memo, dated 29 Dec 
2007, from the Radiation Safety Section Leader to the Director of ESH&Q if dosimeter 
issue was restricted to Rad workers and very limited visitors this could reduced to about 
14,000.  Although the memo identifies risk associated with limiting dosimeter issue to 
only Rad workers and very limited visitors most other DOE installations have reduced 
dosimetry issue to only those required.  Substantial cost savings can be realized.
